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Translation and (Counter-)Intelligence: The Interpenetration of Social-Systemic 




Translation and (counter-)intelligence are two social-systemic boundary phenomena. 
Translation acts on the outside of the boundary, ectohomorously; (C)I acts on the 
inside, endohomorously. This article describes the complex interaction between them. 
Their functioning may overlap, as is the case in (C)I field operations, or they may act 
separately, as at (C)I headquarters. In the field, agents operate within a narrow, very 
focused sector with precise tactical tasks and they simply cannot always afford to 
have translators helping them; in the field, translation and (C)I tend to interact within 
one and the same agent who acts both endo- and ectohomorously. At headquarters, 
(C)I is removed from direct exposure to the enemy, so it can afford to act 
endohomorously and delegate the ectohomorous function to translation. Moreover, 
(C)I activities at HQ are strategic and cover expansive geopolitical regions, making it 
impossible to combine the endo- and ectohomorous functions in one agent. As a 
result, the focus of (C)I is on endohomorous functions, such as planning and carrying 
out (counter-)intelligence activities, and translation is practised by special agents: 
‘linguists’ or ‘translators’.  
 
Key words: translation; intelligence; sociology of translation; boundary phenomena; 
CIA 
 
1. Lost among the Shadows 
 
Modern societies existing in the form of nation-states can be described as social 
systems composed of subsystems responsible for various social functions: for 
instance, politics, the economy, education, the arts etc. (Luhmann 1995, 2000a, 
2000b, 2004, 2013; Runkel and Burkart 2005). Arguably, translation can be viewed as 
one of social function subsystems (Tyulenev 2012). 
 Some subsystems are responsible for fulfilling the internal and some the 
external functions of the system. Examples of the internal, or inward-oriented, 
subsystems are politics (handling power distribution) and the economy (dealing with 
material supplies necessary for the well-being of the population). Undoubtedly, both 
politics and the economy are often influenced by the system’s environment: for 
instance, the nation qua social system is allying or warring with other nations, social 
systems, in its environment or in its participation in globalised economic processes, 
yet that external influence does not change the nature of its internal social-systemic 
functioning. Indeed, politics is responsible for regulating power distribution within 
the system; the external alliances or wars are made in keeping with the internal 
political logic, and the economy’s social-systemic focus is on fulfilling the material 
needs of its ‘home’ social system. 
Since every social system is also surrounded by other social systems, there are 
necessarily subsystems which “increase the system’s environmental sensitivity while 
releasing other mechanisms for internal functions” (Luhmann 1995: 197). Externally-
oriented social subsystems enable the system to interact with its social environment in 
more efficient ways. Translation is an example of such external, or outward-oriented, 
social subsystems: it allows the system to process the information entering the system 
from its environment: foreign texts, for instance, and also enables the system to 
project information into its environment: for instance, the texts that the system 
produces about itself for consumption abroad (Tyulenev 2012a). The external types of 
social subsystem are referred to as boundary phenomena. Translation is not the only 
boundary phenomenon. Boundary phenomena include international trade relations, 
diplomacy, military actions, cultural exchanges and espionage.  
Internally focused social phenomena interact, as, for instance, do politics and 
the economy, producing different results (cf. the planned socialist economy in the 
former USSR and the free market economy in capitalist countries). Boundary 
phenomena also interact. Each of the academic disciplines studying individual social 
subsystems tends to confine its attention to only one or, at most, two or three 
comparable phenomena, e.g., economists may limit their areas of study to the 
economy and trade relations. The interaction between different social phenomena is 
less studied in Translation/Interpreting Studies (TIS). The goal of the present article to 
contribute to overcoming the disciplinary barriers between historiography and TIS by 
discussing the interaction between two boundary phenomena – intelligence and its 
branch, counter-intelligence (henceforth (C)I; also known as espionage or counter-
espionage), on the one hand, and translation on the other. Why these two? Because 
they cooperate closely, but their cooperation has so far escaped the attention of the 
disciplines in which each one is studied individually.  
Intelligence is studied primarily in a special section of historiography – the 
history of espionage. Espionage includes operations, mainly clandestine, conducted 
by one state against another in order to obtain information, whether available in open 
or secret sources, about another state. In order to protect itself, a state usually also 
conducts operations to counteract espionage by other states; such operations fall into 
the category of counter-espionage (in today’s world (C)I activities are targeted against 
various terrorist groups, but this aspect of (C)I work is beyond the scope of the 
present article).  
Translation is habitually ignored or marginalised in intelligence-historical 
accounts and studies. Although methods of gathering intelligence information are a 
popular research category in intelligence studies (Johnson 2014: 9–10, 17), translation 
is dismissed as an unproblematic transparent screen. In the vast intelligence 
historiography and in theoretical works on espionage, translation may, at best, be 
mentioned, even when it must have played a central role in an intelligence or C(I) 
operation (Hilsman 1956; Platt 1957; Palmer 1977; Riste 1985; Polmar and Allen 
1997; Runde and Voss 1992; Aldrich 2002; Alvarez & Graham 2003; Scott and 
Jackson 2004; Johnson 2007; Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand 2014). For instance, in 
books on the work at the British WWII intelligence centre Bletchley Park, famous for 
breaking the codes generated by the Nazi Enigma machines, as described in McKay 
(2010), Russell-Jones and Russell-Jones (2014) or Dunlop (2015), little is said about 
translation. The same is true in the case of historical accounts of other similar 
clandestine WWII projects (Elliott and Shukman 2003; Macintyre 2010). To give one 
typical example, in his book on the history of breaking the Nazi Enigma codes during 
WWII at Bletchley Park, Top Secret Ultra (1980), Peter Calvocoressi explains the 
path of the intercepted Nazi messages: first, they were decoded, then they were 
translated from German into English. Calvocoressi mentions that the second stage 
included not only translation, but also interpretation (that is, making sense of) the 
messages, which even after decoding could contain some terms or cultural or military 
references requiring explanation. The work at the second stage was first done by 
translators of a lower qualification (notably, conscripted school teachers). If they 
failed to produce a satisfactory translation or to explain a passage, the difficult text 
was passed on to those with a higher level of expertise in the German language and 
culture, e.g., university professors. It is clear from Calvocoressi’s account (who, 
incidentally, himself worked at Bletchley Park during WWII and had first-hand 
knowledge of its operations) that translation was not as straightforward as it might 
seem: it included not only rendering messages into English but also interpreting the 
contents of the messages, and this two-in-one procedure did pose problems, which 
explains the need for translators with various levels of expertise. However, rather 
disappointingly, this complex process of translation occupies much less space in 
Calvocoressi’s book and in other historians’ studies of the work of centres like 
Bletchley Park than the breaking of codes (cf. Kahn 1967), as if the former was much 
less problematic than the latter.  
There is a similar blind spot in TIS: there has been little examination of 
translation as used in intelligence. There is considerable interest in studying the 
various social roles translation plays in society. Within the sociological turn, or 
paradigm, in TIS, there are numerous studies on how translation interacts with the 
mass media, with ideology, power distribution, culture, gender and, which is 
especially relevant to the present discussion, politics (including diplomacy, Osborne 
and Rubiés 2016), but there are few studies on the role translation plays in 
international clandestine activities. Yet the number of translated materials and the 
extent of translators’ involvement in intelligence gathering/processing are 
considerable, in terms of both volume and importance, and there is a striking 
difference in the way translation is practised in (C)I operations and in other social 
contexts.  
The question arises: Why is it important to study translation in its interaction 
with espionage? There are several reasons. Firstly, examining this kind of translation 
would give us a clearer understanding of the involvement of translation in the 
formation of intrastate, interstate and world politics. Secondly, studying interactions 
of (counter-)intelligence and translation would give rise to new questions, such as the 
specificity of translation in the (C)I context as opposed to the translation as practised 
elsewhere, or invite a reformulation of familiar questions: for instance, To what extent 
are translation as an activity and translator as an agent of that activity, and, 
consequently, theorising translation and translator, the same or different things? What 
constitutes the translator qua social agent? What are the social roles the translator may 
play alongside translating? Does his/her role and, consequently, the scope of her/his 
activities change depending on the circumstances in which the translation is carried 
out? Should s/he be viewed as a translator or an advisor/expert and what does that 
imply? Finally, with regard to their professional ethics, studying translation in 
intelligence contexts would also help to reveal new aspects of translators’ 
(in)visibility and of their professional profiles, among other things. The present article 
represents a first step in this direction. 
 
2. Delaminating Boundaries 
 
On closer inspection, the boundary of the social system consists of two layers: 
internal and external. The internal layer includes social agencies which deal with 
foreign phenomena indirectly, in the sense that agents may act without necessarily 
knowing or using foreign language(s) or culture(s), i.e., without coming into direct, 
unmediated verbal contact with the target social system. The external layer is 
composed of the agencies which enable the internal layer to establish direct 
(unmediated) verbal contact with the foreign environment, i.e., using the foreign 
language and culture. For instance, the military forces of a state need translators and 
interpreters to help them make sense of intercepted documents or communication 
between enemy military forces, or to interrogate prisoners of war.   
In the following discussion the internal layer of the social boundary will be 
termed ‘endohomorous’; the external – ‘ectohomorous’ (from the Greek words 
‘endon’ meaning ‘within’, ‘inside’, and ‘ektos’ meaning ‘without’, ‘outside’, 
combined with the word ‘homoros’, related to ‘horos’ – ‘border’). Endohomorous 
phenomena operate on the inside of the social linguo-cultural boundary (e.g., the 
military forces in the example above), whereas ectohomorous phenomena operate on 
the outside, constituting the point of actual verbal contact between the system and its 
environment (translators and interpreters). 
Translation, being the ectohomorous phenomenon, in various forms (such as 
kinetic or interlingual or intercultural, see Tyulenev 2018: 37–45; 2015: 36–40) is 
inevitably present in the operations of any endohomorous phenomenon. Translation 
as a social agency (as opposed to translators/interpreters) is always part of the 
linguo-cultural boundary interactions. Indeed, endohomorous agents, e.g., diplomats 
or military (wo)men, may have a command of the foreign languages of the country 
with which they are dealing, and they translate their ideas from their mother tongue 
(even if their command of the foreign language is near-native). They are not what we 
would call professional translators/interpreters but they produce translation. In other 
words, translation as a type of activity may be there even without the social agents 
who may be referred to as (professional) translators, i.e., persons who participate in an 
interaction in no other capacity than that of linguocultural mediator. 
 
3. Translation in the Wilderness of Mirrors 
 
In this section, post-WWII declassified CIA documents are analysed (see Primary 
Sources in References). A note is called for here to justify the use of (C)I materials 
when discussing the relations between translation and intelligence. 
Intelligence is the gathering of information about competing powers, for the 
most part in political contexts (although there may be other types of intelligence, e.g., 
economic espionage). The powers against which espionage is used may want to fend 
off their rivals’ intelligence by running counter-intelligence. (C)I may be carried out 
by entire institutions. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Counter 
Intelligence Corps (CIC) are examples of such institutions. One of the most famous 
CIA counter-intelligence chiefs, James Angleton, called (C)I work the wilderness of 
mirrors (adapting an image from T.S. Eliot’s poetry) referring to the challenge of 
operating in a world of secrecy and deception – in a world of spies and agents and, 
sometimes, of double or even triple agents.  
For the purposes of this article, the difference between intelligence and 
counter-intelligence, which may be considerable both in intent and in the methods 
used and also in the types of operation carried out, is less important than in other 
contexts. Here, both intelligence and (C)I are treated as kinds of the same social 
function helping the system (e.g., a nation-state) to deal with its environment, which 
is composed of other social systems (other nation-states). (The blurring of the line 
between intelligence and counter-intelligence is also found in CIA documents. For 
instance, the Army intelligence branch G2 shared translated documents with CIC, cf. 
CIA 3: items 1, 3, 4, 5, 8).  
All CIC operations can be divided into two types (CIA 1: 6). The first type is 
operations in the field, for instance, in the post-WWII European theatre of operations 
(as in the documents analysed below). The second type is (C)I activities at CIC or 
CIA headquarters, in the U.S.A. 
Yet another note is necessary concerning the methodology used below. (C)I 
materials are documents of a special nature. Firstly, there is a considerable time lag 
between the creation and use of these documents and any possible subsequent 
examination, since the latter can be carried out only after the documents have been 
declassified. Secondly, the researcher may not always be able to study translations 
together with their originals: the originals may not always be available among the 
declassified materials. This is partly because of the secrecy surrounding the 
documents and the fact that archives may not survive (or be made available) fully; 
and partly because of the operational use of the documents, with translations being 
preserved but originals possibly being disposed of because they were seen as having 
little value for (C)I decision makers who might not always be able to read the source 
texts in the original languages.  
The materials analysed below fall into the category of materials made 
available in translation but without source texts. Therefore, in this case, the 
methodology of comparing source texts with target texts, usual in TIS research, was 
impossible, and the researcher had to draw conclusions about the translations based 
on an analysis of the target texts alone. This situation is not unique to the present 
research – it is a common practice in the textual criticism of the Old and New 
Testaments. This is inevitable because there are no extant originals (Greenlee 1964; 
Parvis and Wikgren 1950). However, arguably, meaningful conclusions about 
translation as a process and as a social activity can be reached, as I attempt to show in 
the analysis that follows. 
 
3.1. In the Field 
 
The mission of the CIC was originally defined as being  
 
to contribute to the successful operations of the Army Establishment through 
the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and 
[the] detection and prevention of espionage and sabotage within the Army 
Establishment and such areas over which it may have jurisdiction. (CIA 1: 2) 
 
Here we see that the CIC is part of the Army and its function is to ensure that Army 
operations do not suffer as a result of any form of secretive operations against them.  
Most of the contact the Army has with the enemy is in the form of physical combat, 
and in order to do that there is little need to know the enemy’s language or anything 
about his culture. If social systems are compared to bubbles, then the two warring 
systems, i.e., the systems contacting each other through their armies, are like two 
bubbles bumping into each other without penetrating each other. The Army, thus, 
functions endohomorously, it stays on the inside of the social-systemic boundary.  
During WWII and in its aftermath, the CIC operated not in open combat with 
the enemy but secretively. No CIC agent was to be identified as a CIC member “in an 
unclassified publication,” and rosters of CIC personnel were to be “handled as 
CONFIDENTIAL information” (CIA 1: 4; highlighted in the original). CIC agents 
were allowed to operate in “civilian uniform” and, when in civilian clothes, were to 
be addressed as “Mister” (ibid.). This secretiveness was necessary to allow CIC 
agents to infiltrate the target society. The CIC contacted the enemy ectohomorously, 
in an unmediated fashion, although secretly or in disguise. In contrast to the Army, 
the CIC’s primary task is to penetrate the enemy’s ‘bubble’ to learn the enemy’s plans 
or to get hold of any other potentially useful information. CIC members had to come 
into daily contact with the high-ranking officers of foreign armies, and with high-
ranking civil officials; they controlled civilians, participated in arrests “of important 
personages” (CIA 2: 3); they dealt with informants and established informant 
networks (CIC 2: 2, 5, 9, 11–12). Therefore, a command of the enemy’s language and 
an understanding of the enemy’s culture was seen as necessary: “[e]very effort [was 
to] be made to cause Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to gain a useful knowledge 
of any foreign language spoken in the area of assignment and ideologies with which 
his duties require familiarity” (CIA 1: 15; also CIA 2: 2).  
However, in reality, the situation was far from desirable: 
 
The principal deficiency in [CIC members’] qualifications was the lack of 
background in languages. Despite efforts to insure that training in German 
would be a portion of all replacements’ qualifications, as late as January, 
1945, only 26.9 percent of the Corps’ members could be classified as having a 
working knowledge of the German language. (CIA 2: 2) 
 
To solve this problem, three measures were taken: 
 
(1) During WWII, CIC agents were trained in French and German (CIA 2: 7–8). The 
training of CIC agents working in Germany also included instruction in “the 
organization of the German intelligence services, the Nazi party, and its satellite 
bodies” (CIA 2: 8). It will be noted that the ectohomorous functioning required not 
only a knowledge of the enemy’s language but also of his political and intelligence 
organizations, his political culture. 
   
(2) The CIC “transferred promptly” German-speaking personnel from other Army 
branches (CIA 2: 8). The fact that the CIC was able to recruit people able to act 
ectohomorously from the Army shows that that ability was less important for an 
endohomorous social structure such as the Army. However, it was of paramount 
significance for the CIC, which was to act ectohomorously. 
 
(3) It was also realised that there was a need for translation/translators. “The lack of 
qualified linguists in the Counter Intelligence Corps presented a continuing 
operational problem which was only partially overcome by the use of untrained 
civilian and Military Intelligence interpreters” (CIA 2: 13). (C)I moved from the 
ectohomorous position to the endohomorous position, delegating the former position 
to translation performed by civilian and military interpreters. This third measure was 
taken “only partially,” one of the reasons being that translation was found rather 
cumbersome:  
 
Interrogation through an interpreter is at best of indifferent effectiveness, 
because of [sic] the rapid-fire follow-up, essential in breaking down a cover 
story, cannot be attained when the subject has time to compose himself while 
his replies are being translated to the interrogating agent. (CIA 2: 13)  
 
In the field, the CIC operated via detachments which were “split into small sub-
sections of two or three agents each” (CIA 2: 12). The sub-sections acted as 
independent units coordinated by the detachment commander. Operating as small 
units, CIC field agents had to act not only endohomorously but also ectohomorously, 
i.e., as translators and interpreters – if they could. When they could not translate, i.e., 
act ectohomorously, they acted only endohomorously, as was the case during the 
interrogations described above. In such situations, (C)I moved inwards within the 
social-systemic boundary, and translating agents were called upon to act 
ectohomorously. When the CIC staff used their knowledge of foreign languages and 
cultures, translation was still taking place ‘inside their heads’, it was still there (cf. 
any foreign language user’s experience of speaking in a foreign language). 
Intelligence always required translation because translation, not intelligence qua 
social function, was at the contact point of the two interacting social systems; it was 
translation that made the intelligence function possible by offering (C)I access to the 
other side of the social-systemic boundary. The boundary was crossed by 
endohomorous agents only when they acted ectohomorously. If endohomorous agents 
failed to act ectohomorously, then translation as a separate agency surfaced; then 
ectohomorous agents, interpreters, were brought in and translation became visible as 
the contact point between the interacting social systems. The boundary visibly split 
into two layers: internal and external, whereas when the CIC staff themselves acted as 
translators/interpreters, the two layers, while still present, operated within one and the 
same agent, a CIC member.  
 
3.2. At Headquarters 
 
Translation functioned differently in the headquarters of CIC or G2 (the intelligence 
branch of the US Army). The CIC and G2 staff at HQ acted primarily as users of 
translations produced by those who were referred to as ‘translators’ or ‘linguists’. The 
boundary was clearly divided into the internal, endohomorous, and the external, 
ectohomorous, layers.  
In G2 there was a special “Translation Section” (CIA 3: item 1). It included six 
full-time translators. The translators did “full translation or exploitation [see an 
example of exploitation below] of publications for intelligence purposes”; they also 
translated “foreign correspondence for various non-intelligence agencies of the 
Department of the Army” (ibid.). The translation section worked with 32 languages 
“with varied effectiveness” (ibid.). The focus was on the Soviet Bloc which was a 
result of the shift in post-WWII geopolitics: now the Soviet Bloc was the principal 
rival, rather than Germany and its former allies. The Slavic languages dominated 
among the 32 languages. 50% of the total amount of translated and “exploited” 
material was material found useful for G2’s Technical Branch and its Technical 
Services, 30–40% of which was material strictly scientific and technical (ibid.), 
implying that the majority of the translated material was of the intelligence nature.  
In the Army, “the only formal translation facilities were maintained by the 
Army Map Service” (CIA 3: item 2). Books, newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets 
were screened; “primary activities,” i.e., translation, were “applied to toponymy,” 
although “marginal text of foreign published maps and the titles, tables of contents, 
and chapter headings” were also translated (CIA 3: item 2a). Partial or complete 
translations were made “if required” based on the translations of titles and tables of 
contents (ibid.). Translation functioned as a guide, providing a repertoire of 
possibilities for further inquiries to be made by decision-makers (analysts and 
strategists). Translation functioned in the same way outside the AMS, for instance in 
the Signal Corps (CIA 3: item 3).  
The AMS Technical Services Division “employed” 48 “linguists”: “28 [were] 
assigned to Soviet and Satellite areas; 18 to Chinese-Mongolian areas; and 2 to North 
Korea” (CIA 3: item 2a). In the AMS Geodetic Division, there were 20 translators 
(ibid.: item 2c). This was considerably more than in the G2 Translation Section. The 
(C)I institutions involved in the translation work employed part-timers and other staff, 
notably, “research personnel not classified as translators but having varied language 
proficiency” (CIA 3: item 2b). Thus, there was an overlap between endo- and 
ectohomorous functions, although this overlap was only episodic (as opposed to how 
the two functions operated in the field). Normally, decision-makers did not handle 
documents in the original languages (unlike the CIC agents in the field) and that 
would have been impossible anyway, given the number and variety of the languages 
in which the analysed documents were written.  
Thus, in the field, (ideally) the endohomorous agency had to coincide with the 
ectohomorous: CIC agents had to be able to work as translators for themselves. 
However, sometimes the two boundary phenomena had to separate: CIC agents did 
the endohomorous (C)I work and translators did the ectohomorous work. At HQ, the 
preferred situation was the opposite: the more professional translators there were, the 
better, i.e., ideally, endohomorous agents focused on the endohomorous, (C)I, work, 
letting translators do the ectohomorous work. However, as we have seen, in the field 
the situation was not always ideal, nor was it at HQ. In some documents there are 
reports of a shortage of translators: “[t]he facilities of AMS are not fully adequate to 
meet the needs of the Corps of Engineers” (CIA 3: page 1). That is when endo- and 
ectohomorous functions overlapped at HQ. 
The range of topics covered in translation was quite broad, although it was 
weighted towards documents about matters that would naturally interest military 
decision-makers. CIA 5 provides a list of texts translated over a period in 1946 – see 
Table 1 (spelling and punctuation as in the original; in the original the pagination is 
not correct: the actual page 4 is not numbered while the subsequent pages start with 4, 
the page number of the actual fourth page is marked below as 3a): 
 
Table 1. Thematic Areas of Translation 
 
Thematic area Examples of Translated Texts 
Intelligence 
 
 “Types and Intelligence Value of 
Credentials Carried by people of East 
Soviet Union” (p. 2), “Radio Intell. Data 
– Special Russian Intel. Nobs – 70” (p. 
3). 
Geography (from the military point of 
view)  
 
A series of texts entitled “Sailing 
Directions” for the Barents Sea in the 
territory of the USSR, for China and 
Korea (p. 1). 
Military materials (including those 
containing information on weapons) 
 “Field Instructions of the Office of 
Torpedo Instructions for Submarines” or 
“Sea Warfare Instructions Part 2 – Mine 
Laying Tactics,” “V-2 Bomb,” “Military 
Handbook of European Russia” (p. 1). 
Foreign economies “List of Industries in USSR” (p. 1); 
“Tables Showing Location of Power 
Plants in Soviet USSR [sic]” (p. 3). 
Science  “Russian Scientific Periodical 
(Oxygen)” (p. 1); “Journal of the 
Chemical Industry Soc. Mar. 43 –1 Nov. 
45 Nos. 1–75” (p. 2). 
Politics  “Biographies of Proletarian Movement 
Workers” (p. 1); “Plans for Large Scale 
Training of Young Workers” (p. 3a). 
General social information “Compendium of Laws – Russia” (p. 1); 
several translations entitled “Russian 
Newspapers for Summary” (p. 2). 
 
From Table 1 it becomes clear that only materials of a very particular nature were 
translated. The texts tended to be quite ‘technical’ and highly specialised. That 
naturally caused problems for ‘linguists’: they lacked the expertise necessary to select 
materials for translation that an expert would have selected. In CIA 4, a document 
discussing specifically the deficiencies of CIA translating facilities, we read that the 
Foreign Documents Division (FDD) lacked “sufficient personnel to translate all the 
material required” and it did not have “translators with sufficient knowledge of the 
subjects [technology and economics] being translated to permit a completely 
satisfactory selection of material for translation” (ibid.: para 3).  
One of the available solutions was to contract the work out to the private 
sector (CIA 3: item 3), and translations made elsewhere were utilised. Subcontracting 
of translations to “outside services” had to be done “on a highly selective basis in 
view of the security aspects involved” (CIA 4: item 2). “Many industries” having 
translation services were named among the potential subcontractors (ibid.), such as 
the American Chemical Society, the Dupont Company, Allied Chemical, 
Carborundum Company and General Electric. These companies had “the competent 
staffs” with “the unique combination of language facility and technical knowledge” 
(ibid.). Even university students were sometimes employed: 
 
Attempts should be made to procure translations of Soviet orbit material from 
outside sources. FDD has already undertaken such a program on a limited 
scale. This operation should be expanded. Universities all over the country 
have students engaged in translating publications from behind the Iron Curtain 
and could provide translation of value. (CIA 4: item 3) 
 
Thus, using external translators with the expertise that the internal (C)I translators 
lacked was a way to ensure a dialogue between the two boundary sides, internal and 
external. The two boundary phenomena, (C)I and translation, were separated at HQ 
and that separation, while having advantages, came at a cost – the quality of the 
translation services provided was lower and, consequently, that had a detrimental 
effect on the efficiency of (C)I functioning. 
Once the documents had been obtained (for instance, by being captured, as 
described in CIA 7), translation work began. The flow of the translation was 
documented in a special form: a “Routing Slip” (CIA 8). The form registered the date 
when a text for translation was received together with the initials of the person who 
provided it, the date when the translation process began, when the translation was 
“edited” and “read”; all editorial changes were to be approved by “Chief Translation,” 
and “Chief PACMIRS” (Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section). After that 
the translated text was sent to “Production.” Then the text was proof-read. There 
were, however, cases when the translation process had to be expedited quickly, and 
translations that were only “partially checked and unedited” were sent for utilisation 
(CIA 9). Such translations were termed “advance copies,” and there was a special 
procedure and a special form to use for requesting them (CIA 10 and CIA 11). We 
should note that the production of a translation always, both in the case of a fully 
processed translation and in the case of advance copies, involved cooperation between 
the two boundary phenomena: source texts were provided or requested by (C)I; 
translation translated only what (requested selected materials) and how (i.e., 
controlled via editing) it was asked to translate. Also noteworthy is the involvement 
of PACMIRS, i.e., the (C)I personnel, who, together with the Chief Translation, 
approved the translated text. 
The weekly workload of a translation section can be assessed by looking at a 
report about the working week of a translation team (CIA 12). 12 translations were 
completed; 102 translations were in process; 5367 abstracts were completed; there 
was a rubric “Summaries completed,” but in that particular week there were no 
summaries to translate, so there is “0.” Interestingly, there was a sixth rubric which 
provides information on how many “sacks” of documents were received, processed 
and “on hand”: 25, 133 and 225 respectively. The fact that documents were counted 
by the sack perhaps implies that they had been captured from the enemy (cf. CIA 7). 
It is clear from the above that there were several forms of translation. There 
was also a special type which can be called a translation-cum-survey-cum-report. This 
is what is often called ‘exploitation’ rather than ‘translation’ of foreign texts. The key 
genre features of the translation reveal the author/translator profile as yet another 
locus of the interpenetration of (C)I and translation.  
The CIA document entitled “Translations of North Korean Newspapers” is 
composed of two texts which are here referred to as TNKN: I and TNKN: II, followed 
by a page number). The opening paragraph of TNKN: I gives the context of the 
publication: 
 
On 2 March, the Choson Central News Agency, Pyongyang, (covered in the 3 
March 1953 edition of the Minchu Choson) reported the adoption on 18 
February by the North Korean Government of Cabinet Decision No. 28, 
“Measures for Remedying State Commerce and Cooperative Societies.” 
(TNKN: I: 1; hereinafter underscored in the original)  
 
The term “Minchu Choson” is translated as “Democratic People’s Newspaper” in 
TNKN: II, which chronologically precedes TNKN: I and which was probably 
translated first. In what seems to be a directly translated passage, the translation 
techniques would not surprise a translation scholar. However, the inserted translations 
of the titles of the newspapers was only the beginning of a much more obvious 
involvement of the person(s) who worked on the translation. For instance, in TNKN: I: 
1, there is a footnote to a sentence in the main body of the translation: “[…] in the 
past, emphasis was placed on cities in order to assure that the predetermined 
quantities [of consumer goods] would be distributed.” The footnote reads: “It is 
implied here that rural areas in the past had been neglected due, perhaps, to 
inaccessibility and to the fact that city populations are greater. –Ed.” (ibid.). This 
gives a better idea about the agents involved in translation: there was an “editor” who 
was sufficiently knowledgeable about the subject matter and the country to be able to 
provide additional information to help his or her readers. 
 One can see the translator/editor’s presence not only in the footnotes but also 
in the main body of the text presented as translation: “Of the new measures included 
in Cabinet Decision No. 28, one change is particularly noted: the areas in which the 
State Commerce and Cooperative Societies operate are to be divided” (TNKN: I: 2). 
The translator obviously knows about all the new measures and highlights one of 
them, which must be a result of the analysis of the original publication; thus, what is 
referred to as a “translation” reads more like an analytical summary of the original 
documents.  
The farther we read, the clearer it becomes that the text is a combination of 
more or less literal renditions of the source material and a superimposed analysis. The 
following excerpt furnishes a clear illustration: 
 
From 1 January 1953 to early April, 1953, the North Korean press […] 
reported 46 cases of arrested secret agents, not counting those arrested near the 
battle-line by the NK People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces. 
(TNKN: II: 1–2)  
 
A list follows: 28 secret agents were arrested by the People’s Self-Defence Corps, 12 
by civilian inhabitants, 3 by local officials, 2 by police and 1 by the NK People’s 
Army. The text of ‘translation’ thus includes statistical data collected over the period 
of several months (January-April 1953). At some point, the author even calls his/her 
text a ‘report’: 15 other cases, although they were reported in the NK press, are said to 
have been “omitted from this report because names and addresses were not given” 
(TNKN: II: 9). 
 The analyst (who might also be referred to either as a translator or an editor or 
all the ‘three-in-one’) explains further that the crucial role assigned to the Self-
Defence Corps in the anti-secret agent campaign is emphasised. The reader is 
presented with a brief history of the Self-Defence Corps in which the 
translator/analyst cites some original documents marking them as citations (with 
double inverted commas):  
 
When the Corps was organized in 1948-49, the NK Communists gave as its 
purpose “the protecting of rural communities and government offices from 
reactionary invasion.” (TNKN: II: 2) 
 
The fact that this historical excursus was made by the author of the English version is 
abundantly obvious not only because of the addition of quotation marks, but also 
because of the insertion of the following comment:  
 
Gradually, the Corps members began to receive military training with wooden 
guns, thus providing the NK government with a large reserve of young 
military manpower for a two-fold purpose: for the future attack on South 
Korea, and for quelling civil disturbances by the NK populace. (TNKN: II: 2) 
 
No NK newspaper would have openly referred to uses of the Corps such as attacking 
South Korea or helping to put down disturbances caused by their own compatriots.  
There is another interesting addition to the information in the original NK 
publications made by the author(s) of the English version. In rendering a citation from 
the Minchu Choson about the role of Corps in the opening paragraph, the translator 
identifies the author of the source text, Pang Hak-se, “NK Minister of Home Affairs,” 
as “a Soviet Russian citizen” (TNKN: II: 1). This must have been designed to alert the 
potential reader to the extent of cooperation between the NK government and the 
USSR – indeed, even such a high-ranking government official as the Minister of 
Home Affairs was in fact a Soviet citizen. This identification of a Russian agent in the 
NK government must have come from an expert CIA worker who was not only able 
to render a NK newspaper article into English but also knew who was who in NK 
politics. The tip-off was important as it alerted the potential reader to the significance 
of the rendered mass media materials for (C)I activity planning.  
 This type of translation/report in which the voice of the translator/editor is 
very prominent may be interpreted as a translation with a radical degree of 
skoposisation. The term ‘skopos’ was introduced in the 1980s by the German 
translation theorists Katharina Reiß and Hans Vermeer (2013) to emphasise the fact 
that translators (should) produce translated texts which would have a particular socio-
cultural function in the target societies, i.e., translations should achieve a 
communicative goal (the meaning of the original Greek term ‘skopos’). The theory 
sounded like (and was criticised as) radicalising translation and freeing the translator 
from the obligation to be ‘faithful’ to the source text. Hence, Christiane Nord (1991), 
in an attempt to mend (the reputation of) the theory, introduced the ethical 
requirement for the translator to be loyal to the source text’s author. This initiative 
may be laudable, but in real life, at least as we see it in the world of (C)I, ethical 
principles may be very different and even more radical than elsewhere. The principal 
faithfulness was manifested by the translator to his/her audience, not at all to the 
source text or society – in fact the latter was viewed as an enemy. Moreover, genre-
wise, the translator had a very specific goal (skopos): to inform, as fully as possible, 
(C)I decision-makers. If texts which were translated did not exhaust the information 
required about a particular region, such as North Korea in the example above, the 
translator did not hesitate to take upon him/herself other roles and act as an expert in 
interlingual and intercultural communication. In this sense, the translator did anything 
that would allow him or her to achieve the main goal – that of fully informing his/her 
target audience who were interested in the subject matter discussed but might have 
not been knowledgeable enough to appreciate the submitted translations without the 
translator’s comments, clarifications or even advice. Translation’s goal was, thus, 
considerably more than rendering a text, more even than providing information, 
sometimes it was also to offer advice! This is what radical skoposisation of a 
translation act/text means. 
 This radical skoposisation is interesting not only because it provides a new 
take on the skopos theory. In the discussion in hand, which is focused on the 
dynamics of the relationship between the two boundary phenomena – (C)I and 
translation – the radical skoposisation of translation resulting in a text product that 
was a hybrid of translation and (analytical) report and guide to action can be seen as 
the result of the crossover of two different boundary phenomena acting on different 
sides of the social-systemic boundary. Indeed, the translator, the ectohomorous agent, 
whose primary function was to ensure a linguocultural contact with the ‘other’, acts 




In this article, translation and (counter-)intelligence have been revealed as two 
boundary phenomena, translation acting on the outside of the boundary, 
ectohomorously, (C)I acting on the inside, endohomorously. The two interact in 
complex ways depending on where they function. They interact differently in field 
(C)I operations from at (C)I headquarters: in the former they tend to act with a 
considerable overlap, whereas in the latter they tend to act separately. This difference 
in the dynamics is only natural: in the field, agents operate within a narrow, very 
focused sector with precise tactical tasks and they simply cannot afford to have 
translators helping them, at least not all the time. In the field, translation and (C)I tend 
to overlap in one and the same agent who tries his/her best to act both endo- and 
ectohomorously. At headquarters, (C)I is removed from direct exposure to the enemy, 
it can afford to act endohomorously and delegates the ectohomorous function to 
translation. Also (C)I activities at HQ are to a greater degree strategic and cover entire 
geopolitical regions, countries or even, as was the case with the Soviet bloc, groups of 
countries. It would be impossible for any individual (C)I agent to have expertise 
broad enough to encompass several languages-cum-cultures. That is why the focus of 
(C)I at HQ is on its endohomorous functions, such as planning and carrying out 
(counter-)intelligence activities based on the analysis of available information as 
regards the enemies or rivals of its social system. Translation is practised by special 
agents, referred to as ‘linguists’ or ‘translators’. Yet in some cases, such as the case of 
translating North Korean newspapers, even at HQ, translation as an agency assumes 
endohomorous functions: the producer of a ‘translated’ text inserts additional 
information that clarifies something that may be only implied in the source text, or 
gives more or less open pieces of advice.  
Translation enters complex relations with not only internal function 
subsystems which have long attracted scholarly attention in TIS. Translation also 
interacts with other systemic boundary phenomena; the interacting boundary 
phenomena can penetrate each other. That, in turn, may affect translation’s skopos 
(Reiß and Vermeer 2013), which may become radicalised, so that the translator acts in 
a way comparable to the way Justa Holz-Mänttäri (1984) imagined the social role of 
translator qua expert in intercultural communication, although, in the case of the 
interaction between (C)I and translation, with a completely different ethical agenda – 
not to contribute to cooperation between the interacting social systems, but to 










CIA 2: “Organization and Operation of the Counter-intelligence Corps in the 
























CIA 8: “Routing Slip,” 1945 (https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP81-00706R000100050009-7.pdf) 
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